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Trident: Efficient and Practical Software Network Monitoring
Xiaohe Hu, Yang Xiang, Yifan Li, Buyi Qiu, Kai Wang, and Jun Li
Abstract: Network monitoring is receiving more attention than ever with the need for a self-driving network to tackle
increasingly severe network management challenges. Advanced management applications rely on traffic data
analyses, which require network monitoring to flexibly provide comprehensive traffic characteristics. Moreover, in
virtualized environments, software network monitoring is constrained by available resources and requirements of
cloud operators. In this paper, Trident, a policy-based network monitoring system at the host, is proposed. Trident is
a novel monitoring approach, off-path configurable streaming, which offers remote analyzers a fine-grained holistic
view of the network traffic. A novel fast path packet classification algorithm and a corresponding cached flow form
are also proposed to improve monitoring efficiency. Evaluated in a practical deployment, Trident demonstrates
negligible interference with forwarding and requires no additional software dependencies. Trident has been deployed
in production networks of several Tier-IV datacenters.
Key words: cloud networking; software network monitoring; network programmability; network management

1

Introduction

Network management has been more challenging than
ever as network complexity dramatically increases
and failures become severe and knotty. Following
the great success of software-defined networking, the
vision of a self-driving network has been proposed
to apply data-driven modeling and machine learning
to traffic data analyses and closed-loop network
automation[1, 2] . Figure 1 shows the framework of
the self-driving network. Recent works[3–5] have
started to build network data analytics platforms and
provided logically centralized abstraction for learning
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applications. Therein, the first important step for traffic
data analytics is network monitoring which collects the
traffic information.
The focus of this study is on software network
monitoring in the data plane. Software network
monitoring is part of software network processing,
which runs network software at end hosts. Software
network processing, such as network virtualization and
network function virtualization, is a pillar of multitenant cloud datacenters. It is flexible to develop new
functionality and programmable model with software
network processing. The combined constraints of cloud
virtualization environment and traffic data analytics
highlight three key requirements for software network
monitoring.
(1) Noninterference. The intention of monitoring is to

Fig. 1

Basic framework of a self-driving network.
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facilitate network management to not interfere with the
original network delivery, i.e., forwarding, especially
in end hosts that have shared and limited resources
for network processing. Moreover, mixed monitoring
and forwarding logic increase the complexity of
operation and troubleshooting. (2) Comprehensiveness.
A self-driving network relies on a comprehensive
knowledge of traffic, and perception algorithms need
to work at different packet granularities from a
flow-level header to application-level payload. For
example, flow scheduling[6, 7] based on flow statistics
and deep inspection[8, 9] mines and matches payload
signature patterns. (3) High efficiency. Software network
processing is both time and resource consuming.
Software network monitoring should be efficient to
handle traffic with limited resources, quickly respond to
the traffic status to support the fast control loop, and save
network bandwidth due to the increasing traffic volume
in cloud datacenters.
Previous works can be categorized into two directions:
(1) direct streaming, which sends original traffic to
remote analyzers from switches by mirroring[10] or
configured forwarding rules[11, 12] , and (2) local counting,
which runs local algorithms to count traffic and sends
statistics data to collectors, such as hash-based[13, 14] and
sketch-based[15] . Although direct streaming can provide
comprehensive packet information, it suffers from high
resource consumption and interferes with forwarding,
which degrades the original forwarding performance.
On the other hand, local counting improves monitoring
efficiency with careful data structure design, but it tailors
the header structure and fails to support a full packet
view. Hence, none of the various existing software
monitoring solutions meet all the requirements.
In this paper, Trident, a novel software network
monitoring approach at the host, is proposed to
realize the noninterference and comprehensiveness
requirements. Trident integrates the design of off-path
monitoring and configurable streaming. It is decoupled
from the forwarding path and trades the overhead
of copying incoming packets for noninterference.
When shortage of Central Processing Unit (CPU)
resources happens due to competition from forwarding,
Trident adaptively samples traffic to save resources for
forwarding and guarantees its noninterference. Trident
provides a full packet view by streaming the monitored
packets and flexibly interacts with traffic analyzers
with a policy-oriented programming model. Analyzers
can define desired packets with match-action rules and
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acquire packets at different granularities from the header
to payload.
The main technical challenge of the host monitoring
design with the new approach of off-path configurable
streaming is to realize high efficiency. Trident
incorporates a wildcard-match fast path to improve the
average classification performance. A novel hash-based
packet classification algorithm, Unified Space Search
(USS), and a corresponding cached flow form, uniflow,
are proposed. USS maps original flow entries to unified
non-overlapping flow entries, i.e., uniflows, which can be
stored in one hash table. Fitting well with fast-path flow
caching and classification, uniflows and USS achieve a
high cache hit rate and near single-hash-lookup speed
with limited memory usage. In addition, a lightweight
compression algorithm is proposed for header delivery,
saving bandwidth usage.
To mitigate the complexity of system deployment in
cloud, Trident adopts a widely-used kernel module (the
same interface as tcpdump) and requires no additional
kernel dependencies. It has been deployed in production
networks of several Tier-IV datacenters and provides a
stronger capability of network traffic analyses. Currently,
Trident implementation monitors 2105 packets per
second (abbreviated as pps below) traffic for header
delivery consuming at most 0.3 core of Intel E5 CPU.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the background of network monitoring,
related work, and motivation of the Trident design.
Section 3 introduces the Trident system architecture and
describes the proposed algorithms and Trident modules.
Section 4 presents the Trident implementation. Section
5 shows the evaluation. Section 6 discusses the current
limitation of Trident. Section 7 concludes the paper by
presenting the conclusion and future work.

2

Background

Network monitoring collects traffic data for better
understanding and management of the running networks.
Monitoring tools[16–18] have been embedded within
network elements, such as servers, switches, and routers
for several decades. Network monitoring schemes evolve
with the development of programmable networking
and datacenter networking. Recent works include
designing expressive monitoring primitives and/or
interfaces[4, 5, 14, 19, 20] , optimizing algorithms and/or
systems[14, 15, 21–24] to improve scalability with large
traffic volume and limited resources, and exploring
monitoring supported functionalities such as near-
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optimal traffic engineering[25, 26] and network-wide
troubleshooting[23, 24, 27] .
Data plane network monitoring has hardware form
(in commodity switches) and software form (at end
hosts). Monitoring schemes adopted in hardware
and software are similar. In hardware monitoring,
OpenSample[28] , Planck[26] , and Everflow[24] directly
stream data packets to remote analyzers by sampling or
forwarding rules. FlowRadar[21] and OpenSketch series
works[19, 20, 22] embed optimized hash and sketch logic
into programmable silicon.
Compared with hardware solutions, software
monitoring is more flexible to develop desired
functionality and provide more detailed characteristics
of virtual networks in cloud. Data plane software
network monitoring is designed by two dimensions and
falls into four main categories, as summarized in Table 1.
The first design dimension is whether monitoring is
processed on or off the forwarding path. The second
design dimension is whether monitoring is counting
statistics locally or streaming traffic to remote analyzers
directly.
Specifically, FCAP and SMON are designed in both
on-path and off-path forms[29] , the evaluation of which
shows that off-path approaches reduce the forwarding
delay introduced by monitoring. UMON[13] monitors
kernel space traffic with configured flow entries and
collects statistics in user space tables. Trumpet[14] uses
hash tables to monitor network events at Google end
hosts. SketchVisor[15] realizes a robust software sketch
solution with an augmented fast path and control plane
recovery algorithm. OpenStack Tap-as-a-Service[10] uses
the port mirroring method and sends traffic remotely.
Software switches, such as Open vSwitches[11] and
VFP[12] , can be used to direct desired traffic with
configured forwarding rules in the same way Everflow
conducts with hardware switches.
Trident fills in the blank of the off-path streaming
design, meeting the software network monitoring
requirements of noninterference and comprehensiveness.
Trident realizes off-path processing using the Linux
shared memory interface, mmap, the same way as
Table 1

Category
On-path
Off-path

SketchVisor. Moreover, Trident provides a policy-based
streaming model for remote analyzers. The policies are
in a widely-used match-action form. To meet the high
efficiency requirement and improve the processing speed
of monitoring policies, Trident proposes a novel fast path
packet classification algorithm, i.e., USS, with a cached
flow form, i.e., uniflow.
Packet classification is an important research topic
and used in various network functions, such as switch,
firewall, and quality of service. Classical fast packet
classification algorithms are decision-tree-based[30–32] ,
which trades pre-processing time for compact tree
structure and fast speed. Due to the dynamic rule update
requirement in cloud[11] , hash-based packet classification
algorithms, such as Tuple Space Search (TSS)[33] , are
adopted as the fast update feature of hash schemes.
An example of the TSS algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.
TSS groups the rule set with tuples, i.e., header mask
vectors. Rules with the same tuple can be classified with
a hash table, the key of which is the rule prefix. To
classify a packet, first, do AND operation on the packet
header and the tuple, and then use the result as the key
to look up the tuple hash table. Assume that a hash
table lookup/update complexity is O.1/, and then TSS
lookup/update complexity is O.T / (to traverse the tuple
list, T represents the tuple number).
As the rule number increases, the tuple number, i.e.,
lookup complexity, increases and TSS classification
speed is slower than that of decision-tree algorithms. The
fast path can be used to increase the system average
classification speed. The fast-path design is a general
cache approach used in networks. Packets arriving at

Fig. 2

TSS algorithm example with a two-field rule set.

Summary of the software network monitoring work in the data plane.
Local counting
Direct streaming
Hash-based: UMON[13] , On-path-FCAP[29]
Port mirroring: OpenStack Tap-as-a-Service[10]
Sketch-based: On-path-SMON[29]
Configured forwarding rules: Open vSwitch[11] , VFP[12]
[14]
[29]
Hash-based: Trumpet , Off-path-FCAP
Configured monitoring policies: Trident
Sketch-based: SketchVisor[15] , Off-path-SMON[29]
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a network system will be first classified and executed
in the fast path. If the packet is not matched in the
fast path, then it will be classified in the slow path with
the complete rule set and a computed sub-rule will be
cached in the fast path for the classification of subsequent
packets. The fast- and slow-path framework is shown in
Fig. 3.
Open vSwitch adopts the fast-path design and uses
TSS in the slow and fast paths. Given that the matched
rule in the slow path cannot be directly cached into the
fast path (if rules with higher priorities exist in the slow
path and are not cached, then the fast path classification
semantic becomes incorrect), Open vSwitch generates
wildcard megaflows into the fast path to increase
the cache hit rate (compared with the exact match).
Megaflows are in the same prefix/mask form as rules
in the TSS structure. When a packet is classified in the
slow path, an all-zero mask vector hm1 ; m2 ; : : : ; mF i (F
represents the field number) is initiated and performed
by the AND operation with each TSS tuple. Then,
the cached megaflow is hp1 =m1 ; p1 =m2 ; : : : ; p1 =mF i
(hp1 ; p2 ; : : : ; pF i represents the arriving packet header).
However, due to the exhaustive AND operations in slow
path, megaflow masks are close to the longest rule masks,
resulting in a low wildcard space size, i.e., cache hit
rate. Trident proposed uniflows cover a larger space than
megaflows, improving the fast path cache hit rate.

3

Design

This section starts by providing an overview of the
Trident architecture. Then, it describes the Trident
monitoring approach to realize noninterference and
comprehensiveness. Next, it elaborates how Trident
classifies packets in accordance with monitoring policies.
Finally, it describes how Trident exports desired traffic
data.
3.1

455

an independent, lightweight, and policy-based
programmable monitoring system. Figure 4 shows the
architecture of Trident.
Native kernel space function. The kernel space
functions are responsible for packet capturing. Same
as tcpdump and wireshark, Trident uses the general
and widely-used interfaces AF PACKET/libpcap and
Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF)[34, 35] . In this way, Trident
provides a mechanism as acceptable as tcpdump, and
therefore alleviates cloud providers’ concern on inserting
uncertain modules. It pulls packets from kernel space to
user space with a zero-copy ring buffer through mmap.
Moreover, to avoid getting unnecessary (e.g., control
messages) and redundant (e.g., bridged and duplicated
interfaces in OpenStack) packets, Trident performs a
light pre-filter in accordance with the network interface
index ifindex using BPF which is configured by the
bytecode loaded from the user space.
Single user space process. Trident runs its main
functions within a user space process. Regarding
programmability, the process has an agent thread that
receives monitoring policies from the remote controller.
The agent is responsible for updating local policies and
BPF bytecode. The Trident process involves classifiers
and exporters, which stream desired traffic to remote
analyzers for further processing, such as statistics and
deep inspection. On receiving packets from the kernel
space, Trident executes the corresponding classifier in
accordance with the ifindex, and then exports policyselected packets. The design of the classifier and exporter
is elaborated in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
3.2

Monitoring

Trident proposes a novel monitoring approach, i.e.,

Architecture

Trident is designed with the objective to be

b

f

Fig. 3

Fast- and slow-path framework.

Fig. 4 Architecture of Trident. Trident performs off-path
traffic monitoring within the host hypervisor and interacts
with the remote controller and analyzers.
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off-path configurable streaming, as categorized
in Table 1. Compared with other monitoring
approaches, Trident meets the noninterference
and comprehensiveness requirements. This subsection
shows Trident’s monitoring approach in detail.
Noninterference. Trident is decoupled from the
forwarding path of network processing, which is
responsible for the application traffic delivery. In this
way, packet copying is traded for an independent
monitoring process. Therefore, Trident can be scheduled
to either share the same core with forwarding or run on
a separate core from forwarding, depending on the cloud
provider’s strategy.
Furthermore, given that current datacenters allocate
limited resources for software network processing,
Trident supports adaptive traffic sampling, making
it run with any workload without interference with
forwarding resources. Trident can be configured with
two kinds of parameters: the maximum core (i.e., CPU
usage) allocated for Trident and the allocated cores
shared with other network processing. The Trident agent
reads the configuration and periodically checks the
corresponding CPU usage. By default, Trident monitors
every incoming packet. Once the CPU usage exceeds
the limit, the Trident agent will push a new BPF
bytecode with an updated sample ratio to the kernel. The
current Trident ratio control policy uses the Additive
Increase Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) strategy as the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) rate control.
Trident supports controller-defined policies which
specify the desired traffic with different header fields
and corresponding actions. Hence, cloud providers can
flexibly steer selected traffic data to destined analyzers
and depict the traffic profile of individual cloud tenants.
The monitoring policies of Trident employ the matchaction model, which is pervasively leveraged by firewall
Access Control Lists (ACLs), OpenFlow, and many other
network functions. Current match supports 6 tuples, i.e.,
interface, src ip, dst ip, src port, dst port, and protocol,
described in a prefix/mask format. Trident provides two
actions: (1) header, to send the packet header and related
states, such as timestamp, sample ratio (if enabled), etc.
and (2) payload, to send the original packet. Trident
acts as a white-list, thus any unmatched packet will be
omitted by Trident.
3.3

Classifier

Separating monitoring policies from forwarding policies
drives Trident to design a novel scheme for monitoring
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policy classification. Trident adopts the slow and fast
path design to improve the average processing speed.
Trident keeps TSS as the slow path classification
algorithm, the same as Open vSwitch, given the fastupdate and linear-memory properties of TSS. To tackle
the limitations of TSS on the slow classification speed
and fast-path low cache hit rate, Trident optimizes the
fast path classifier design. A general hash-based packet
classification algorithm USS is proposed, and then it is
applied to fast path caching and classification.
To elaborate further details about USS, each rule
in policies is referred to as a flow entry. In the
view of computational geometry, an exact flow entry
represents a point in multidimensional space, and a
wildcard flow entry represents a hyperrectangle in the
multidimensional space.
USS is hash-based and aims to decrease the time
complexity from TSS O.T / to the optimal one hash
table lookup O.1/. USS exploits the latent capacity of
non-overlapping flow entries and constructs a kind of
non-overlapping uniflows, which can be classified with
a single hash table. Therefore, the problem boils down
to transform the original flow entries to a specific form
of non-overlapping flow entries, i.e., uniflows, and then
make hashing work on them.
USS construction and lookup. The basic idea of
USS is to align the masks of flow entries to the longest
mask in each field, i.e., to cut flow entries by the longest
mask, and then use the prefixes of the transformed
flow entries as keys of the hash table. Considering that
real-life flow entries are unevenly distributed and long
masks are collocated[36, 37] , USS uses a hierarchical and
grouped mask structure to mitigate the space explosion
due to the mask alignment. The USS data structure
construction and lookup are illustrated with an example
shown in Fig. 5.
The construction process consists of three stages. (1)
Mask mapping. First, cut each field into sub-spaces
by the first X bits (X is a predefined hyperparameter).
Refer to the first X bits as a sub-prefix for conciseness.
Then, store the longest mask of each sub-space in
mask arrays for the mask alignment of next stage. For
example, the Internet Protocol (IP) space is cut by the
first 16 bits, and the port space is cut by the first 8
bits. Figure 5b uses a 6.4104 unit array for IP mask
mapping and a 256-unit array for Port mask. In the
sub-space of the IP sub-prefix 0:0, the longest mask is
set to 22 instead of the global longest mask 24, thus
saving the aligned flow entry number. (2) Grouped
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s p

Fig. 5
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s p

Example of the USS construction process.

transformation. Align the original flow entry mask in
each sub-space, i.e., to cut the flow entry by the longest
mask, and then generate non-overlapping uniflows. For
example, in the sub-space of the IP sub-prefix 1:2, the
longest mask is set to 24, and the original flow entry
oFlow3 W h1:2:2:0=23; 80=16i is cut to two transformed
uniflows uniflow3 W h1:2:2:0=24; 80=16i and uniflow4 W
h1:2:3:0=24; 80=16i. The grouped and aligned uniflows
are shown in Fig. 5c. (3) Uniflow hashing. Due to
the non-overlapping property, the transformed uniflows
can be classified within a single hash table. The hash
table keys are the prefixes of the uniflows, and the
values are the uniflow actions. For example, uniflow1 W
h0:0:0:0=22; 443=16i in Fig. 5c corresponds to the
key uniflow1 -prefixesW h0:0:0:0; 443i in Fig. 5d. The
resulting lookup data structure is composed of the mask
arrays and the uniflow hash table. The USS construction
algorithms are shown in Appendix (Agorithms 1–3).
During the lookup process, the mask arrays are first
accessed to get the corresponding longest mask in each
field in accordance with the sub-prefixes of the arriving
packet header. Then, the lookup key is computed by an
AND operation of the packet header and field masks.
Finally, the key is used to perform a hash lookup in the
uniflow hash table and derive the matched action. For
example, given the structures in Figs. 5b and 5d, if a
packet p that p.ip D 1:2:2:3 and p.port D 80 arrive,
according to mask arrays, the IP mask of sub-prefix 1:2
is 24 and the port mask of sub-prefix 0 is 16. Then the

computed key is h1:2:2:0; 80i. The hashed value is act3
in the bucket of uniflow3 -prefixes, and finally p will be
executed with the action act3 , which is the action of
original oFlow3 . The USS lookup algorithm is shown in
Appendix (Aglorithm 4).
Uniflow caching and fast-path USS classification.
To use USS in the fast path, firstly, construct mask arrays
(Fig. 5b) from the original flow entries and initial an
empty uniflow hash table (Fig. 5d). Then, cache wildcard
flow entries into the fast path. Instead of the AND
operations performed on the megaflow mask and each
TSS tuple to ensure semantic correctness, uniflows can
be directly cached from the slow path to the fast path
because of the non-overlapping property of uniflows.
Therefore, the caching process is that when an arriving
packet is classified in the slow path, (1) the longest mask
of each field is identified through the sub-prefix of the
packet header, (2) an AND operation of field masks and
the packet header is performed, (3) the AND operation
result is the uniflow-prefixes key and the slow-path
classification result action is the bucket value, (4) the
hkey; valuei pair is inserted into the fast path hash table.
Finally, subsequent packets can be classified in the fast
path with the normal USS lookup process. The uniflow
caching algorithm is shown in Appendix (Algorithm 5).
In a general packet classification scenario, USS may
still suffer from the space-consuming problem when the
flow entry distribution is quite spread out. However,
when USS is applied to fast path classification, the
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problem is not significant at all due to the fast path
cache property, i.e., dynamically maintaining part of
the rule set instead of the complete rule set in the
slow path. The uniflows are generated and dynamically
cached packet by packet from the slow path, and when
the cached uniflow number exceeds the given fast path
maximum uniflow cache size, the cache replace approach
is adopted. Therefore, by adopting USS classification
and uniflow caching, Trident fast path gains the wildcardmatch capability and preserves a near-session lookup
speed, i.e., the number of mapping array accesses and
one uniflow hash table lookup.
3.4

Exporter

Exporters are responsible of executing policy actions
and delivering monitored traffic data. The exported
traffic data are encapsulated by either User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) or Virtual eXtensible Local Area
Network (VXLAN) header, and its destination is set
to a dispatcher switch. Using the UDP channel requires
a Trident collector process to parse monitored data in
the remote analyzer. By contrast, for private third-party
analyzers, Trident supports original packet delivering
through the VXLAN channel, which is parsed and
decapsulated by dispatcher switches.
Note that modern cloud datacenters leverage tunnel
policies in forwarding virtual switches to realize
network virtualization. However, the tunnel policies
are not visible to Trident, resulting in indistinguishable
Virtual Machine (VM) traffic in analyzers when Trident
monitors traffic from more than one VM with the
same address but in different virtual networks. To
monitor the original forwarding traffic, a key observation
is that traffic from one single interface belongs to
a virtual network, i.e., encapsulated by the same
tunnel header. Therefore, monitored traffic can be
unambiguously identified through the combination of a
host identity and an interface identity. The combined
identity is encoded in a self-defined field over the UDP
channel or the Virtual Network Identifier (VNI) field in
the VXLAN channel.
Another adopted approach in exporters is compression
when executing the policy header action. As header
statistics are enabled almost in every monitoring
scenario, compressing the transmitted headers can save a
considerable amount of bandwidth. Header compression
is a common approach in low-speed-link and wireless
communication fields[38–40] . Recent monitoring work
NetSight[23] also uses a compression algorithm based on
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RFC1144[38] . However, NetSight leverages the similarity
between successive packets in the same flow, thus having
to maintain per-flow states. Instead, given that traffic
from one interface still has a relatively high similarity,
Trident leverages the similarity between packets from
the same interface and maintains per-interface states,
saving states and realizing a lightweight algorithm.
Trident uses the same difference-based compression
algorithm as NetSight and RFC1144. In detail, the
first packet is not compressed, and the sender/receiver
initiates and maintains a packet state, i.e., values of
each header field, of each interface by the first packet.
The subsequent packet is compared with the maintained
packet, and only the field value of the subsequent packet
which is different from that of the maintained packet
is sent. Then, the sent field values are updated to the
maintained packet state. With Trident’s per-interface
compression, packets that are not successive but have
the same field can be compressed. For example, for
a sequence of packets hudp, ethernet, icmp, tcpi, the IP
field of udp, icmp, and tcp can be compressed, and the
port field of udp and tcp can be compressed.

4

Implementation

Trident is implemented in Go. Benefitting from
decoupling monitoring and forwarding and using general
interfaces, such as AF PACKET, libpcap, and Go
packages, Trident can be deployed without additional
dependencies. Trident can be used with hypervisors,
such as Linux KVM and VMware ESXi, and virtual
switches, such as Open vSwitch and VMware vSphere
Distributed Switch. As a lightweight solution for
deployment and management, Trident’s bin file is less
than 15 MB, and its bootstrap stage takes only 1 s. Cloud
providers can start to use Trident on all servers with
one single policy to acquire VM traffic header statistics.
For a deeper analysis on specific applications, cloud
providers can enforce fine-grained monitoring policies
and stream the application traffic to specific Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) analyzers.

5

Evaluation

Trident implementation is evaluated and analyzed in a
multi-tenant cloud environment. Firstly, Trident’s fastpath algorithm is evaluated and compared with Open
vSwitch fast path algorithm, then Trident’s performance
on resource usage at a given workload is illustrated, and
the evaluation and analysis of the header compression
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are shown. Finally, a demo of adaptive sampling for
resource noninterference is shown.
Experiment setup. The experiments are run on
a server with an 8-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2650
2.00 GHz and 96 GB DRAM. The fast-path algorithm
comparison uses the public datasets ClassBench[41] in
packet classification. On system evaluation, the server is
configured as an OpenStack compute node with Linux
KVM and OVS, which is connected to a controller server
through a 1 Gbps Network Interface Card (NIC) and
to a Top Of Rank (TOR) switch through two 10 Gbps
NICs. Trident is deployed on this server, monitoring the
traffic of virtual interfaces and exporting desired states
to a remote analyzer through the 10 Gbps NICs. Traffic
is replayed by tcpreplay, including CAIDA Internet
trace[42] and random traces generated by Linux pktgen.
A CentOS VM is launched in a virtual network on this
server as the sender, which sends traces to a gateway
VM in another server through the 10 Gbps NICs.
Fast-path algorithm. Trident generates uniflows and
classifies uniflows with USS in fast path, whereas Open
vSwitch generates megaflows and classifies megaflows
with TSS in the fast path. Tested slow-path rule sets
include ClassBench synthesized Access Control List
(ACL) rules from 100 to 104 size and Firewall rules
from 100 to 104 size. Traces are randomly generated
in accordance with the corresponding rule sets. The
experiment fast-path flow entry size, i.e., cache size,
is set to 1000 (corresponding to 1000%, 100%, and 10%
of the slow-path rule sizes 100, 103 , and 104 ) for both
Trident and Open vSwitch.
The fast-path hash table lookup times with full cached
flow size are evaluated and shown in Table 2. Although
TSS needs to classify a group of hash tables, the
experiments show that the hash table lookup times of
TSS with megaflows are almost as linear as those of
USS with uniflows. The reason is that to maintain the
semantic consistency of cached flow entries in the fast
path and original flow entries in the slow path, generated
megaflows need to intersect slow-path tuples, resulting
in near one minimal tuple. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 6,
the average expressed flow size (cache hit rate) of a
megaflow is serveral order of magnitude smaller than
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Fig. 6 Average cached flow size of the megaflow and uniflow,
representing the fast path caching hit rate. Y-axis is shown in
the log scale. On each flow entry, the space size is calculated
by multiplying each field size.

that of a uniflow. The overhead of the linear hash lookup
and high cache hit rate properties of USS with the
uniflow is the bounded-memory mask arrays, which
consume less than 132 KB (216 sub-prefixes of src ip
and dst ip, 28 sub-prefixes of src port and dst port, and
24 sub-prefixes of protocol) for any 5-tuple rule set.
Resource usage. Trident resource usage on the
CPU and memory is evaluated. Trident is configured
in two modes: header statistics with header-action
policies and selective packet mirroring with payloadaction policies. Five types of traces are used: four
randomly generated traces with the packet length ranging
from 64 to 1458 bytes and one payload-stripped CAIDA
trace due to anonymity.
Table 3 shows the CPU usage results at 2105 pps.
Decoupling monitoring from forwarding adds one-copy
overhead to the forwarding path. This overhead is shown
in the middle column of each monitoring mode. The
Sum column represents the actual CPU usage of Trident.
Trident consumes more CPU resources when mirroring
traffic, which is sourced from the packet Input/Output
(I/O). For a large packet length, i.e., 1458 bytes, the
exported packet will be encapsulated and fragmented,
thus resulting in a higher CPU usage. On memory usage,
Trident consumes around 329.6 MB memory in the noload condition, which is mainly from mmap, packet-

Table 2 Fast-path hash table lookup times compassion on TSS with megaflow and USS with uniflow. x in rule set ACL1 x and
FW1 x represents rule size in the set.
Rule set
ACL1 100
ACL1 103
ACL1 104
FW1 100
FW1 103
FW 104
TSS with megaflow
1
1
1
3
2
2
USS with uniflow
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 3 Trident CPU usage at 2  105 pps. Random-x traffic
pattern represents the packet source IP and randomly varying
ports. The packet length is set to x. Mon represents the CPU
usage of the Trident process. Copy represents the CPU usage
of the copy overhead introduced to the forwarding path. Sum
represents the sum of Mon and Copy.
(%)
Header statistics
Packet mirroring
Traffic pattern
Mon Copy Sum
Mon Copy Sum
Random-64 12.23 11.91 24.14 58.32 9.37 67.69
Random-512 10.43 8.72 19.15 59.18 9.83 69.01
Random-1024 11.38 14.15 25.53 62.69 13.28 75.97
Random-1458 12.15 16.21 28.36
100 17.85 117.85
CAIDA
14.68 3.64 18.32 55.97 3.58 59.55

sending buffers, and fast-path tables. Due to the garbage
collection mechanism of Go, the accurate memory usage
for random traces cannot be shown. For processing the
CAIDA traces, Trident consumes 336.9 MB memory.
Trident increases slight memory consumption while
monitoring traffic due to the wildcard flow caching of
the fast path.
Header compression. The header compression
ratio is evaluated with CAIDA traces. Figure 7
shows the original packet rates of forwarding and
after-compression packet rates of monitoring during
400 s. Trident achieves around 45:1 compression ratio
on pps. In the quantitative analysis, the compression
algorithm generates 22-49 bytes-long headers and
assembles these headers in 1500 bytes-long packets that
contain 48 bytes metadata. Therefore, the compression
ratio is theoretically ranging from 29:1 to 66:1.

Fig. 7 Traffic rate example that Trident monitors and
compresses the header statistics.
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Moreover, according to the profiling result, the
computation overhead of the header compression in the
Trident process is 15.94% (8.52% comparing +7.42%
appending), whereas 50.66% computation is from the
mmap read operation.
Adaptive sampling. The adaptive sampling of the
CPU usage of Trident is shown in Fig. 8. The desired
CPU usage is set to 10%. The sent traffic rate varies
between 150 and 250 kpps.

6

Discussion

Currently, Trident is limited in two aspects. (1) Overhead
of the off-path monitoring. This aspect is due to the
copy of incoming packets and introduces additional
computation in the forwarding path and may also limit
the monitoring throughput. The latest AF PACKET
v4[43] , not yet merged to the kernel main branch, is a
promising way to mitigate this overhead, which realizes
zero-copy by mapping Direct Memory Access (DMA)
packet buffers to the user space. (2) Lack of kernel
bypassing support[44] . The current Trident design is
based on the kernel I/O mode, which can not achieve
10 Gbps throughput for 64 bytes packets with one core.
As Go provides a Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK)
binding operation, the future version will integrate the
kernel-bypassing I/O mode. Besides the limitations

Fig. 8 Demo that Trident can dynamically vary the
sampling ratio to keep the CPU usage at 10%. The sampling
ratio here means dividing the number of monitored packets
by the number of forwarded packets.
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and corresponding optimization, Trident will adapt to
standard control protocols, such as OpenFlow, and more
traffic analyzers.

7

Conclusion

Self-driving networks aim to make network management
simple and intelligent, which depends on data analytics
and closed-loop control, and network monitoring is a
fundamental pillar of the closed-loop network. In this
paper, Trident, a forwarding-independent system for
software network monitoring, designed with a new angle
of off-path configurable streaming, is proposed. Trident
is policy-oriented to support both header statistics
and full packet delivery. Trident realizes negligible
interference and high efficiency with a novel fast path
design, compression algorithm, and adaptive sampling.
The current Trident implementation processes header
statistics of 2105 pps traffic with at most 0.3 core of
Intel E5 CPU.
Future work will incorporate zero-copy and kernel
bypassing techniques into Trident and enhance the
Trident programming model to adapt to standard control
protocols, such as OpenFlow, and more traffic analyzers.

Appendix
USS construction algorithms contain rule mask alignment
function, mask array construction function, and uniflow
table construction function (Algorithms 1–3).
USS lookup algorithm uses the constructed mask arrays
and uniflow table (Algorithm 4).
Uniflow caches are drived from arriving packets
(Algorithm 5).
Algorithm 1 Rule mask alignment
Let DIM be the dimension bit number vector, and D be the
dimension number
Execute AlignRule(r; out rs, tr, longest masks, D 1/
function (AlignRule r, out rs, tr, longest masks, d )
if d D 0 then
tr.action = r.action
out rs.add(deep copy(tr))
return
end if
for i D 1 ! 2longest masksŒd  r:maskŒd  do
tr.prefix[d] = r.prefix[d]C..i 1/  .DIMŒd 
longest masksŒd //
tr:maskŒd  D longest masksŒd 
AlignRule(r, out rs, tr, longest masks, d 1)
end for
end function
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Algorithm 2 Mask array construction
Let X be the first bit number vector for grouping
function (SetMaskArray (rs, mask arrays))
Initiate dimension mask array vector mask arrays[D]
for i D 0 ! D 1 do
Allocate memory size 2XŒi for mask arraysŒi
end for
for i D 0 ! rs:size 1 do
for j D 0 ! D 1 do
sub prefix D rs:ruleŒi:prefixŒj .DIMŒj  XŒj /
if rs:ruleŒi:maskŒj >mask arraysŒj Œsub prefix
then
mask arraysŒj Œsub prefixDrs:ruleŒi:maskŒj 
end if
end for
end for
end function
Algorithm 3 Uniflow table construction
function (SetUniflowTable rs, mask arrays, table)
Let trs be the transformed uniflows
for i D 0 !rs.size 1 do
for j D 0 ! D 1 do
sub prefix = rs.rule[i ].prefix[j ]  (DIM[j  XŒj ])
longest masks[j ] = mask arrays[j ][sub prefix]
end for
AlignRule(rs.rule[i], trs, tr, longest masks, D 1)
end for
for i D 0 !trs.size 1 do
table.add(trs.rule[i].prefix, trs.rule[i].action)
end for
end function
Algorithm 4 USS lookup
function (USSLookup mask arrays, table, p)
for j D 0 ! D 1 do
sub prefix = p.header[i ]  (DIM[i XŒi/
mask = mask arrays[j ][sub prefix]
keyŒi = p:header[i ] &  .1  (DIM[i] mask) 1/
end for
table.lookup(key, action)
return action
end function

Algorithm 5 Uniflow caching
function (UniflowCaching fpath mask arrays, fpath hash
table, p, action)
for j D 0 ! D 1 do
sub prefix = p.header[i ](DIM[i] XŒi/
mask = fpath mask arrays[j ][sub prefix]
key[i] = p.header[i &  .1  .DIMŒi mask/ 1/
end for
fpath hash table.add(key, action)
end function
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